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DEADBEAT DADS AS CHAMPIONS OF
FEDERALISM? LOPEZ'S DRAMATIC
(UNINTENDED?) EFFECT ON COMMERCE
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE, AS ILLUSTRATED
BY THE CHILD SUPPORT RECOVERY ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
As a direct response to commercial disputes between the states
under the Articles of Confederation,' the Constitution of the United
States mandates that "[The Congress shall have Power] to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes."2 During different periods of history, the Supreme
Court has alternated between narrow and broad constructions of this
clause, thereby regulating the breadth of Congress's ability to, in turn,
regulate things in and affecting interstate commerce.' For the past half-
century, many activities have been construed as affecting commerce
which, at first glance, may not seem even remotely like commerce or, for
that matter, anything else governed by Congress's enumerated powers
1. See BORIS I. BITTKER, BiTrKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
§ 5.01, at 5-3 (1999). Bittker notes:
[James] Madison wrote that the federal power over commerce "grew out of the
abuse of the power [during the Articles of Confederation period] by the importing
States in taxing the non-importing, and was intended as a negative and preventive
provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to be
used for the positive purposes of the General Government." As for federal
regulation of private enterprise, it was scarcely even being discussed in the first few
decades of the Constitution's life.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY: A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 80 (1996).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause) (emphasis added).
3. See infra Part II.
4. Id. Though not often cited in Commerce Clause cases, the Necessary and Proper
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, may at least play an implicit role as an alternative
constitutional basis to justify congressional forays into the regulation of things not obviously
interstate commerce. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor convincingly argued this in her dissent in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985):
This Court has been increasingly generous in its interpretation of the commerce
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In this sense, Commerce Clause jurisprudence necessarily intersects
with the Tenth Amendment,5 as many areas of regulation not
specifically delegated to Congress in the Constitution nevertheless fall
under the ambit of the Commerce Clause when a broad construction is
applied.
Over the last six decades, the Supreme Court has applied a very
broad interpretation of the clause.6 Accordingly, Congress's power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause has become plenary over that
period, with the Court sanctioning legislation that affects many aspects
of American life, including those areas of legislation that have
traditionally been reserved for the states, most notably criminal7 and
family law.8 In fact, the argument can be (and has been) made that the
exercise of the commerce power as it is currently construed is often
tantamount to an implicit grant of a police power to the federal
government, a power that is not enumerated and thus reserved to the
states by virtue of the Tenth Amendment. At the very least, it allows a
power of Congress, primarily to assure that the National Government would be able
to deal with national economic problems ....
It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that the Supreme Court was blind
to the threat to federalism when it expanded the commerce power. The Court based
the expansion on the authority of Congress, through the Necessary and Proper
Clause, "to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are
appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end." It is through this reasoning
that an intrastate activity "affecting" interstate commerce can be reached through
the commerce power.
Id. at 583-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoted in BITTKER, supra note 1,
at 5-11); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 637 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(claiming that congressional commerce power is "complemented by the authority of the
Necessary and Proper Clause"). However, though the Necessary and Proper Clause may be
an alternate basis for expansive congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause, it does
not play a role in the analysis of the most commonly cited cases. Rather, the majority of cases
defends or condemns regulation solely on interpretations of the Commerce Clause itself.
BITTKER, supra note 1, at 5-7.
5. The Tenth Amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (upholding the constitutionality
of criminal sanctions for loan sharking).
8. See discussion of cases construing the constitutionality of the Child Support Recovery
Act (CSRA), infra Part IV.
9. For an example of one such argument, see United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222,
1238-39 (5th Cir. 1997) (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that, since the CSRA is
unconstitutional under all three of the requirements in Lopez, it is tantamount to a federal
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degree of federal regulation of local activities virtually unheard of
during the nation's youth.0
However, in recent years two cases have been decided by the Court
that have the potential to limit the power that Congress hastraditionally
been afforded under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. Lopez,"
the Court struck down the Guns Free School Zones Act (GFSZA),'2 a
federal statute criminalizing the possession of a firearm on or near a
school zone. 3 In United States v. Morrison,4 a provision of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) 5 granting a federal civil cause of action
for the victims of gender-motivated violence was similarly struck down. 6
In arguing these cases, Congress claimed that each Act was
constitutional under its commerce authority. However, for the first time
since 1937, the Court disagreed. Hence, the modern Court has shown
itself willing to buck decades of precedent in order to institute at least
minimal boundaries on congressional power deriving from the
Commerce Clause. When one steps back to look at the larger picture,
these cases intersect with and inform another line of cases represented
by New York v. United States, which purport to limit congressional
police power, which is not an enumerated power). See also United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (discussing the Violence Against Women's Act, and concluding, inter
alia, that "we can think of no better example of the police power, which the Founders denied
the National Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime
and the vindication of its victims").
10. See BIrTKER, supra note 1, at 5-3. After commenting that the current construction
of the Interstate Commerce Clause does little to immunize any economic activity from federal
action, Bittker notes: "This state of the nation would have astonished the first generation of
American lawyers, for whom the constitutionality of federal participation in so-called internal
improvements-the infrastructure of the new nation's economic system-was still a bitterly
contested and unresolved issue." Id.
11. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
12. Id. at 549.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
14. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
16. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
17. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). While this case does not deal directly with Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, it does address the difficulties that come into play when Congress passes laws
that regulate the states themselves. The Court held that, in regulating state government
activities, it cannot do so in such a fashion as to commandeer or coerce the state legislature
into doing its bidding. See id. at 149; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(invalidating a provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act requiring local
police to do background checks on purchasers of handguns on the grounds that it is an
unconstitutional appropriation of state agencies by the national government). However, New
York does recognize the principle that Congress may entice a state legislature to regulate on
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control over the autonomy of state legislatures and agencies. 8 This in
turn belies the Rehnquist Court, as it is presently composed, as more
committed to the never forgotten but seldom-applied tenets of
traditional federalism than any other Court seated in the last three-
quarters of a century. 9
However, upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that the
Court's revitalization of the Commerce Clause is undercut by the
formulation of the Lopez analysis itself. This truth is illustrated by the
set of cases brought under Lopez that challenge the constitutionality of
the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992 (CSRA), a federal law making
it a crime to fail to pay court-ordered child support for a child residing in
another state.2° After the Lopez decision, there was some dispute as to
its own accord through the use of the spending power. 505 U.S. at 167; accord South Dakota
v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-08 (1987) (holding that Congress may use the spending power to
encourage states to do its bidding by conditioning the receipt of federal funds on the passage
of a particular regulation, as long as the regulation has something to do with the overall
scheme of the federal spending program).
18. See supra note 17.
19. This, of course, is not to say that the Rehnquist Court is turning modern conceptions
of federalism on its ear. Despite the undeniable significance of Lopez and Morrison, the fact
remains that congressional authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause is now, and
likely will continue to be, sweeping. These cases do not hold themselves out as a severe
limitation of congressional power. Rather, by the Court's own admission, Lopez only serves
to proscribe an outer limit to the commerce power. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556; accord
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608. For a complex sociological examination of the Court's willingness
to apparently revive some version of traditional federalism as, counterintuitively, a signifier of
the collapse of federalism into a centralized national government, see ROBERT F. NAGEL,
THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (2001).
20. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (Supp. V 1993). In pertinent
part, the original version of this statute read:
(a) Offense. Whoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with
respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished as provided in
subsection (b).
(b) Punishment. The punishment for an offense under this section is-
(1) in the case of a first offense under this section, a fine under this title,
imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or both; and
(2) in any other case, a fine under this title, imprisonment for not more than two
years, or both.
(c) Restitution. Upon a conviction under this section, the court shall order
restitution under section 3663 in an amount equal to the past due support obligation
as it exists at the time of sentencing.
Id. The statute was substantially amended via the Deadbeat Parents Punishment Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-1087, § 2,112 Stat. 618 (1998). It now reads:
Offense-Any person who-
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whether this statute would pass muster under what seemed to be a
stricter interpretation of the Commerce Clause; in virtually every
federal circuit, the CSRA was challenged as an invalid regulation not
contemplated by Congress's commerce power.2 ' However, as with many
other federal statutes,22 the lower courts seemed loath to overturn the
CSRA as outside the boundaries of the Commerce Clause analysis
articulated in Lopez." In 2000, the Supreme Court decided Morrison,
and new challenges to the CSRA have surfaced.24 While as yet none of
these suits have been successful, the CSRA has once again become a hot
constitutional topic. What sets the CSRA rulings apart in the realm of
(1) willfully fails to pay a support obligation with respect to a child who resides in
another State, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period longer than 1
year, or is greater than $5,000;
(2) travels in interstate or foreign commerce with the intent to evade a support
obligation, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period longer than 1 year, or
is greater than $5,000; or
(3) willfully fails to pay a support obligation with respect to a child who resides in
another State, if such obligation has remained unpaid for a period longer than 2
years, or is greater than $10,000;
shall be punished as provided in subsection (c).
18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (Supp. V 1999). The text of the subsections referring to punishment and
restitution are substantially the same. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 228(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1993), with,
18 U.S.C. § 228(c)-(d) (Supp. V 1999).
21. See infra Part IV.
22. Statutes that have come under fire after Lopez are, inter alia, the Hobbs Act, the
federal arson statute, the Anti-Carjacking Act, and the Endangered Species Act. David B.
Sentelle, Speech, Lopez Speaks, is Anyone Listening?, 45 LoY. L. REV. 541,549-56 (1999).
23. See id. An ardent supporter that Lopez (and presumably Morrison) represents a
"sea change" in Commerce Clause jurisprudence, Judge Sentelle of the United States Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit opined on the reasons why the circuit courts chose not to
extend the holding of Lopez:
And so [Lopez represented] another sea change. And so there was a new bold
decision declaring a reversal of the rachet [sic.] and new direction, a return of
federal power to the states respectively or to the people. Or was there?
Much of the legal community seems to think not. Much of the academy, and
unfortunately the bench, seem stuck in the past. They seem to believe that if they
ignore this specter of change, it will go away.
Id. at 548.
24. See infra Parts IV, V.
25. As noted by several critics and legal scholars, while many other statutes have been
challenged after Lopez was decided, few have undergone the same pitched battle as has the
CSRA. Within three years after Lopez, almost all of the circuits had reviewed the law and
found it constitutional. However, the CSRA boasted the dubious distinction of being struck
down as unconstitutional by more district courts during that time span than any other statute.
See Sara L. Gottovi, United States v. Lopez, Theoretical Bang and Practical Wimper? An
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence is that, in reading and applying Lopez,
the circuits have unwittingly pointed to a perhaps unintended2 6
development in Commerce Clause doctrine that has the potential to
undermine the new limitations on congressional power painstakingly
advanced by the Supreme Court.
This Comment will first give an overview history of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence out of which Lopez draws its constitutional
doctrine in Part II, followed in Part III by a detailed exposition and
critique of the three-prong analysis set forth in Lopez and reiterated in
Morrison. This critique will illustrate that, by compartmentalizing the
proper justifications for the exercise of Congress's commerce power into
three distinct categories, the Court has seriously misstated its
precedents. The Comment will then go on in Part IV to present a case
study of how the circuit courts' CSRA holdings highlight this potentially
monumental and, possibly, completely unintended by-product of the
Lopez decision. The CSRA cases illustrate that the Lopez Court
resurrected separate and distinct justifications for congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause, which since 1937 have been
subsumed and controlled by an overarching analytical structure.
According to the Lopez analysis, these justifications no longer need to
be subjected to the scrutiny of a newly empowered Commerce Clause,
consequently undermining Lopez's apparent federalist thrust.
II. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The first construction of the Commerce Clause comes from Justice
John Marshall in the 1824 Supreme Court decision of Gibbons v.
Ogden.7 It was in this case that the Marshall Court first enunciated a
Illustrative Analysis Based on Lower Court Treatment of the Child Support Recovery Act, 38
WM. & MARY L. REV. 577,679-81,681 n.22 (1997).
26. As suggested by the title of this Comment, the question as to whether the effects of
the Lopez and Morrison decisions discussed herein were or were not actually intended by theSupreme Court is deliberately left open. While the impetus of this Comment is in partderived from the apparent contradiction between the "federalist thrust" of recent SupremeCourt decisions on one hand, and the fact that the Lopez and Morrison decisions seem to
undermine that thrust, it remains to be seen as to whether this was an intentional act on thepart of the Court as opposed to an unintended side-effect of years of automatic regurgitation
of several Commerce Clause principles, as implied by the discussion infra Part III.C. As
alluded to at the end of Part V of this Comment, it is ultimately up to the Supreme Courtitself to attempt to clear up such inconsistencies. However, given the apparent pro-federalist
stance of the current Court, one may be led to assume (at one's own risk, of course), that the
undermining effects of the Lopez and Morrison analyses are unintended.
27. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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broad definition of commerce, and set in motion the mechanism
resulting in the current broad conception of Congress's commerce
power. Responding to the position that commerce is limited "to traffic,
to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities,"2 the Court
stated that "[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something
more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."29  As such, the
commerce power is broad, "complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the [C]onstitution."" By way of limitation is the very
nature of the language contained within the Commerce Clause:
Congress can permissibly regulate only such commerce as is carried on
between, or "among" the states. As pointed out in Gibbons, this
necessarily requires intercourse between at least two states and does not
affect that commerce which is carried out solely within one state.'
Unfortunately for future versions of the Court, the very breadth of this
initial definition created great difficulty in determining just what sort of
28. Id. at 189.
29. Id. at 189-90.
30. Id. at 196. It is the "complete in itself" language of this quote that ultimately
obviates the need to invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause in justifying commercial
regulation. Contra Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 583,
584-85 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
31. The Gibbons court ruminated at some length on the essential division between
interstate and intrastate commerce:
The word 'among' means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is
intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the external
boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the interior.
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which is
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State, or
between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or affect
other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
Comprehensive as the word 'among' is, it may very properly be restricted to
that commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which
would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a
State, because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the
particular classes of commerce, to which the power was to be extended, would not
have been made, had the intention been to extend the power to every description.
The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal
commerce of a State.
22 U.S. at 194-95.
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activities came under the rubric of the commerce power.
Arguably, when the Court next had an opportunity to review the
constitutionality of a federal law,32 it began to operate under a much
more restricted view of commerce than originally posited by the
Marshall Court. While Gibbons points out that the Commerce Clause
grants to Congress the authority to enter the territorial limits of the
states, as commerce among the states necessarily must begin entirely
within one state and end entirely within another,33 subsequent decisions
narrowly circumscribe when a given activity actually transforms from
purely intrastate in nature to an interstate commercial activity.34 To
accomplish this, the Court imported from its Dormant Commerce
Clause cases a line of precedents which "held that certain categories of
activity such as 'production,' 'manufacturing,' and 'mining' were within
the province of state governments. 05
Cases from this period which construe the commerce power in this
way (and, indeed, Commerce Clause cases generally) must be read in
the context of the economic and social tensions of their time. In the
years following the Civil War, Americans "turned [their] energies
32. As the Court pointed out in Lopez: "For nearly a century [after Gibbons], the
Court's Commerce Clause decisions dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress' power, and
almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state legislation that discriminated
against interstate commerce." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 553 (1995). This was a
result of the practicality that there was simply little interstate commerce for Congress to
regulate prior to the onset of the industrial revolution. See BITTKER, supra note 1, at 5-3 to
5-4. Thus, the Court was able to develop the counterpart doctrine of the Dormant
Commerce Clause much earlier than the doctrines discussed in this Comment in such notable
cases as Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
See PAUL R. BENSON, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, 1937-1970
25-29 (1970).
33. In turn, Gibbons necessarily entails at least minimal regulation of commercial
activity that occurs wholly within one state:
Can a trading expedition between two adjoining States, commence and terminate
outside of each? And if the trading intercourse be between two States remote from
each other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass
through a third? Commerce among the States must, of necessity, be commerce with
the States. In the regulation of trade with the Indian tribes, the action of the law,
especially when the constitution was made, was chiefly within a State. The power of
Congress, then, whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial
jurisdiction of the several States.
22 U.S. at 196.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 37-43, 57-64.
35. Lopez, 524 U.S. at 554 (citation omitted) (summarizing earlier Commerce Clause
cases).
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primarily to the business of creating material wealth."36  In turn, this
created an economic environment unprecedented in the history of the
nation. As such, the fear of trusts and monopolies and the consequent
"artificial price fixing of goods and services, discriminatory treatment of
customers, and the practical exclusion of any viable competition"37
created civil distrust of large corporations. In response to this,
Congress began to regulate interstate commerce, beginning with the
creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission via the Interstate
Commerce Act of 18873" and with the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890."
However, as part of the political and social elite, the Court "moved
decisively towards laissez-faire constitutionalism[,]"" and as such "[was]
quick to take jurisdiction over cases involving interstate businesses, [but]
did not want to encourage federal regulation of such businesses. ' 42 To
accomplish the aims of laissez-faire constitutionalism, the Court began
to narrowly construe Congress's ability to regulate commerce under the
Commerce Clause.
The most influential and sweeping statement of this policy comes in
36. BENSON, supra note 32, at 48.
37. Id. Benson notes that the Court's earliest Interstate Commerce Clause cases
frequently had to do with the regulation of railroads: "Nowhere, perhaps, was this more
evident than in the railroad industry with its multitude of sharp practices-rebates, pooling
agreements, basing-point systems, and so forth-all of which were designed to exploit
shippers and the general public alike." Id.
38. See LES BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 225. Les Benedict notes:
As companies grew larger, there were fewer of them in any one industry. The
growing concentration of industry made it possible for the leaders in an industry to
know each other, and to cooperate to control the market. As the first well-
organized economic interests, big businesses were able to exercise more control over
their markets and more influence over, government than poorly organized or
unorganized groups like farmers, workers, and consumers.
The ability of big business to cooperate in order to control prices and wages
contradicted most Americans' ideas about how the economic and political system
should work. Most Americans believed in free competition among many employers
and producers. Free competition in an open market would lead to the highest
wages, lowest prices, and best products possible. They were dismayed and angered
as big businesses began to cooperate to close markets and reduce competition.
Id.
39. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-
473, § 4(b) (1978)).
40. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2001)).
41. LES BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 239.
42. 1d. at 241.
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United States v. E.C. Knight Co." Brought under the Sherman Act, this
case outlines the first of several different rationales used to determine
the constitutionality of a statute created under the Commerce Clause, or
of the application of that statute to a particular business concern. In
holding that a national sugar conglomerate's monopoly was not subject
to the Sherman Act, the Court stated:
Doubtless the power to control the manufacture of a given thing
involves in a certain sense the control of its disposition, but this is
a secondary and not the primary sense; and although the exercise
of that power may result in bringing the operation of commerce
into play, it does not control it, and affects it only incidentally
and indirectly. Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a
part of it."
The Court thereby instituted a formulaic test as to whether a given
activity can be brought under the aegis of Congress's commerce power.
E. C. Knight posits the existence of a bright-line distinction between
secondary and primary effects on commerce, such as the manufacture of
sugar, which E.C. Knight directly controlled, as opposed to the
placement of those goods in interstate commerce, which Knight only
controlled via contracts with shippers.45  This "direct/indirect" test
served to narrowly restrict congressional authority by excluding
production activities from the definition of commerce. Congress was
only able to regulate such activities that directly related to the use of
interstate commerce and was thereby precluded from regulating
activities that only indirectly affected commerce and were carried out
wholly within one state.
However, a series of subsequent decisions began to belie this strict
43. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
44. Id. at 12.
45. id. at 17. The Court concluded:
[I]t does not follow that an attempt to monopolize, or the actual monopoly of, the
manufacture was an attempt, whether executory or consummated, to monopolize
commerce, even though, in order to dispose of the product, the instrumentality of
commerce was necessarily invoked. There was nothing in the proofs to indicate anyintention to put a restraint upon trade or commerce, and the fact, as we have seen,
that trade or commerce might be indirectly affected was not enough to entitle
complainants to a decree.
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stance on Commerce Clause jurisprudence. As progressivism took hold
in the early twentieth century, courts began to look more favorably
upon the regulation of big business as an essential facet of progressive
reform and the institution of the welfare state.46 In particular, the
Supreme Court, led by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, became a front of
progressive ideology, and nowhere was this more evident than in the
changes wrought in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The formula
instituted in place of the direct/indirect test by the court invoked the
concept of the "stream of commerce," as illustrated by Swift v. United
States. Contending that his meat packing operation was a wholly
intrastate activity, Swift claimed that the federal government had no
power to enjoin the price fixing scheme that he and his compatriots had
concocted. Again considering the constitutionality of an application of
the Sherman Act, the Court handed down a unanimous opinion that
upheld the law as applied:
Commerce among the states is not a technical legal conception,
but a practical one, drawn from the course of business. When
cattle are sent for sale from a place in one State, with the
expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in
another, and when in effect they do so, with only the interruption
necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is
a typical, constantly recurring course, the current thus existing is
a current of commerce among the States, and the purchase of the
cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.'
Thus, anyone who exercised control over some portion of the
"current of commerce among the states" was subject to regulation by
Congress. This was tantamount to a repudiation of the test applied in
E. C. Knight, as it "was difficult to see how the slaughtering of beef to be
sent through interstate commerce differed from the refining of sugar for
46. For an overview of progressive ideology and how it related to big business, see
generally LES BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 247-66. It suffices to say that the intellectual forces
behind the progressive movement were dissatisfied with the perceived antiquated notion of
laissez-faire economics, and as such, were committed to the use of government as a control
over economy and society in order to improve upon the American way of life. See id.
47. See id.
48. 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (Holmes, J., opinion of the Court).
49. Id. at 398.




Various other cases illustrate the progressive Court's expansive
interpretation of the commerce power. In a series of cases, the Court
consistently upheld the use of the commerce power to prohibit the
"immoral and injurious uses"52 of the channels of interstate commerce.
Thus, the Court upheld the regulation of interstate shipments of lottery
tickets,53 the interstate transportation of prostitutes, and the shipment
of spoiled or mislabeled food across state lines."
In 1914, the Supreme Court continued to reinforce Congress's broad
latitude of discretion under the commerce power with the Shreveport
Rates Case.56  In the process, the Court used the "substantial-effects"
standard:
Its authority, extending to these interstate carriers as instruments
of interstate commerce, necessarily embraces the right to control
their operations in all matters having such a close and substantial
relation to interstate traffic that the control is essential or
appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the
interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under
which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms
and without molestation or hindrance.
It is for Congress to supply the needed correction where the
51. LES BENEDICr, supra note 1, at 262.
52. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citations omitted).
53. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) [hereinafter the Lottery Case].
54. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913).
55. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911). This case, the Lottery Case,
and Hoke mark some of the high points of judicially enforced progressivism and the idea of a
constitutionally centralized welfare state. In the Lottery Case, Justice Harlan inquired:
[M]ay not Congress, for the protection of the people of all the States, and under the
power to regulate interstate commerce, devise such means, within the scope of theConstitution, and not prohibited by it, as will drive that traffic out of commerce
among the States?
Lottery Case, 188 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added). This language is echoed in JusticeMcKenna's opinion in Hoke: "[T]he powers reserved to the States and those conferred on the
Nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote thegeneral welfare, material and moral." 227 U.S. at 322. Consequently, the Court betrayeditself as willing to allow Congress to use any or all of its enumerated powers, for no more
specific reason than the general welfare of the people. See BENSON, supra note 32, at 55-59.
1 56. Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) [hereinafter the
Shreveport Rates Case].
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relation between intrastate and interstate rates presents the evil
to be corrected, and this it may do completely by reason of its
control over the interstate carrier in all matters having such a
close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that it is
necessary or appropriate to exercise the control for the effective
government of that commerce.
7
Therefore, the Court buttressed the substantial-effects concept with
the proposition that such regulations were necessary protections of the
instruments of interstate commerce, which by virtue of the fact that they
necessarily must pass through states, may be subjected to wholly
intrastate activities. 8
However, the attitude of the Court soon began to change once again.
In 1918, the Court decided the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart,59 which
signaled at least a temporary end to the permissive construction of the
Commerce Clause. Responding to the conservative reaction to World
War I and two decades of radical progressivism, the White Court
resurrected the direct/indirect test in order to slow down the steady
stream of commercial regulation6 The Taft Court of the 1920s followed
57. Id. at 351, 355 (emphasis added). The Shreveport Rates Case is perhaps the best
remembered of the Court's numerous railroad regulation cases. From this line of cases was
eventually drawn the inference that any such method of interstate transportation, including,
"'navigable rivers, lakes, and canals of the United States; the interstate railroad track system;
the interstate highway system;.., interstate telephone and telegraph lines; air traffic routes;
[and] television and radio broadcast frequencies[,]'" were to be included as instruments of
interstate commerce. Gibbs v. Babbit, 214 F.3d 483, 490-91 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)
(alteration in original).
58. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 (citing the Shreveport Rates Case and asserting that
"Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities"). See also infra Part III.C.2 for further discussion of Lopez's use of the
protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce as a justification for congressional
regulation under the Commerce Clause.
59. 247 U.S. 251 (1918) [the Child Labor Case].
60. See LES BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 272. Indeed, it is interesting to note that, just as
the Court's expansion of the Commerce Clause can be traced to progressive unease about big
business, it's contraction of Congress's commerce power during the 1920s grew out a growing
comfort and satisfaction with the industrial realm:
As Americans recoiled from radicalism, they became more sympathetic to business
interests. No longer perceived as a rapacious exploiter of consumers and workers,
American business was credited with creating the great prosperity of the 1920s, a
time when ever-greater numbers of Americans could afford to buy the consumer
goods that made life easier and more enjoyable. Outside of some western states,
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suit and began to use the direct/indirect test to strike down just about
every congressional foray into social reform legislation via regulation of
interstate commerce between the years 1918 and 1936.61 In Hammer and
its counterpart, Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,62 the Court struck down
the Child Labor Acts of 1916 and of 1919, respectively. The Acts were
intended to enforce social policy via the Commerce Clause by making it
more difficult to sell goods made by children across state lines. 3 In each
case, the Court followed E.C. Knight and ruled that, since the statutes
regulated "local manufacture" and not interstate commerce, they were
not within an enumerated power, and were therefore unconstitutional
under the Tenth Amendment:
The grant of power to Congress over the subject of interstate
commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to
give it authority to control the States in their exercise of the
police power over local trade and manufacture.
The grant of authority over a purely federal matter was not
intended to destroy the local power always existing and carefully
reserved to the States in the Tenth Amendment to the
Constitution.'
The Court moved on to firmly entrench itself in a pro-state stance by
striking down several federal statutes in cases such as A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States65 and Carter v. Carter Coal.
66
Unfortunately, by that time the nation was mired in the Great
Americans gave little support to proposals for further progressive legislation.
Id. In many ways, it was dissatisfaction with economic affairs that again led society to turn
towards radical regulation of business during the New Deal. Hence, the "pendulum swing"
between permissive and restrictive conceptions of the Commerce Clause must be read in
connection with temporally corresponding historical events. However, as illustrated by the
cases to follow, the 1930s Court was not as quick to follow this societal preference as it
heretofore had been.
61. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
62. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) [The Child Labor Tax Case].
63. The Child Labor Act of 1916 outlawed the transportation of goods made by children
across state lines. The Act of 1919 attempted to do the same by "imposing a punitive tax on
goods made with child labor...." LES BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 276.
64. Child Labor Case, 247 U.S. at 273-74.
65. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding that hourly wage regulations were unconstitutional by
virtue of their indirect relationship to interstate commerce).
66. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding that mining coal was only indirectly connected to
interstate commerce, and consequently the regulation thereof by Congress was
unconstitutional).
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Depression. Despite the need for strong centralization of economic
policy, during the early part of the 1930s, the Court refused to back
down from its support of state sovereignty and continued to strike down
New Deal programs passed pursuant to the commerce power left and
right.67 However, after President Roosevelt succeeded in appointing a
liberal majority to the Supreme Court Bench in 1937, the Court literally
did an about face and "began the process of repudiating dual federalism
and states-rights constitutionalism."68 The watershed decision in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation9 upheld the National Labor
Relations Act, and in doing so, "departed from the distinction between
'direct' and 'indirect' effects on interstate commerce." 70 This case also
served to reintroduce the substantial-effects test into the mainstream of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence:
Although activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and
obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise
that control. Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be
considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view
of our complex society, would effectually obliterate the
distinction between what is national and what is local and create
a completely centralized government. The question is necessarily
one of degree.7'
67. See LEs BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 290-95.
68. Id. at 297.
69. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
\70. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 555 (1995). For a discussion of the conflict
between the Roosevelt administration and the "nay-saying" Court of the 1920s and early
1930s, see LEs BENEDICT, supra note 1, at 290-98.
71. J&L Steel, 301 U.S. at 37 (citations omitted). See also United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100 (1941). In Darby, the Court expanded on the definition of "substantial effect":
The power of Congress... extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to make
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the
exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.
Id. at 118. In essence, the Court asserted that the regulation of things not explicitly commerce
is acceptable, so long as that regulation is necessary to an overall regulatory scheme, i.e., the
protection of things in commerce or the instrumentalities of commerce. It is presumably this
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Explicitly rejecting the direct/indirect distinction for the first time,
the Court went on to apply the test to smaller concerns via the
"aggregate-effects" doctrine in the case of Wickard v. Filburn in 1942.72
The aggregate-effects theory is premised upon the idea that even the
smallest local business concern or activity can have an effect on
interstate commerce if the activity of that concern is taken as
representative of the activities of the industry nationwide.73 In Maryland
v. Wirtz,74 the Court stated: "[Wlhere a general regulatory statute bears
a substantial relation to commerce, the de minimis character of
individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.""5
The aggregate-effects doctrine informs the substantial-effects test and
provides a convenient constitutional mechanism for congressional
regulation of activities that were previously out of the federal
government's reach.
Since the 1940s, Congress's commerce power has become plenary,
with federal regulations touching many important areas that
nevertheless do not intuitively invoke thoughts of commerce per se. For
instance, in United States v. South Eastern Underwriters Association,76
the Court held that insurance, previously supposed not to be
commerce, 77 was subject to the commerce power: "No commercial
language that is echoed by the statement in Lopez that the GFSZA "is not an essential part of
a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated." 514 U.S. at 561.
72. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). Wickard states:
But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as
commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a
substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether
such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as, "direct" or
"indirect."
Id. at 125.
73. Id. at 127-28 (noting that "appellee's own contribution to the demand for wheat may
be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as
here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others similarly situated, is far from
trivial").
74. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
75. Id. at 196 n.27.
76. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
77. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1865) (holding that insurance
contracts are indemnity agreements and as such "are not articles of commerce in any proper
meaning of the word" in that they are "personal contracts between parties which ... are not
inter-state transactions, though the parties may be domiciled in different States").
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enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has
been held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause.""8 In another example, Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States," the commerce power was invoked by the Civil
Rights movement to legitimatize federal prosecution of the motel's
policy against lodging African-Americans." The Court explicitly stated:
That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of
these areas rendered its enactments no less valid. In framing
Title II of this Act Congress was also dealing with what it
considered a moral problem. But that fact does not detract from
the overwhelming evidence of the disruptive effect that racial
discrimination has had on commercial intercourse. It was this
burden which empowered Congress to enact appropriate
legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise of its power,
Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particular
obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was
also deemed a moral and social wrong."
Echoing the standard originally set forth in the Lottery Case and its
progeny,82 Heart of Atlanta Motel looks beyond the actual congressional
motive for passing the act. Instead, the Court was willing to search for
some rational basis that would serve to connect the statute to interstate
commerce. Hence, in Hodel v. Indiana, the Court stated:
A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce
Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a
congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate
78. South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 553. The Court also stated:
The power granted Congress is a positive power. It is the power to legislate
concerning transactions which, reaching across state boundaries, affect the people of
more states than one;--to govern affairs which the individual states, with their
limited territorial jurisdictions, are not fully capable of governing. This federal
power to determine the rules of intercourse across state lines was essential to weld a
loose confederacy into a single, indivisible Nation; its continued existence is equally
essential to the welfare of that Nation.
Id. at 552 (footnotes omitted).
79. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
80. Id. at 243-44.
81. Id. at 257.
82. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
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commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the
regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.83
The institution of this "rational basis" standard confirms the
traditional formulation of the substantial-effects test as one of minimal
scrutiny, consequently giving Congress an almost-plenary power to
regulate under the Commerce Clause.
III. LOPEZ AND MORRISON: CONSTITUTIONAL WONDERS OR
CONSTITUTIONAL BLUNDERS?
A. United States v. Lopez
Between Heart of Atlanta Motel and the mid-1990s, Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause continued to dramatically expand.
However, the situation changed in 1995, a year that saw the Court hand
down its decision in United States v. Lopez.84 Lopez, for the first time in
close to sixty years, struck down a federal statute as a violation of
Congress's power to regulate particular activities under the Commerce
Clause. The majority's opinion, largely an encapsulation of the Court's
storied history of interstate commerce decisions, labors to distinguish
the statute in question from previous cases and thus appears to preserve
as a whole the Court's previous Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
However, the "sea change" of Lopez is not in its reaffirmation of earlier
precedents. 5 Rather, it is the Court's refusal, for the first time in years,
to continue to expand the aggregate-effects doctrine to cover the
regulation of activities that at best have only marginal, inferential
86connections to interstate commerce.
In 1990, Congress enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act
83. 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981). See also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
The Katzenbach Court stated:
As we noted in Heart of Atlanta Motel both Houses of Congress conducted
prolonged hearings on the Act. And, as we said there, while no formal findings were
made, which of course are not necessary, it is well that we make mention of the
testimony at these hearings the better to understand the problem before Congress
and determine whether the Act is a reasonable and appropriate means toward its
solution.
Id. at 299 (emphasis added).
84. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
85. See Sentelle, supra note 22, at 544.
86. See id. at 559.
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(GFSZA),87 which made it a federal offense "for any individual
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone."8 Alfonso Lopez was
indicted under the GFSZA for possession of a firearm on school
grounds, and he subsequently challenged his indictment on the federal
charge, claiming that the Act was beyond the enumerated powers of
Congress and therefore unconstitutional.89 However, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas denied his motion,
"concluding that § 922(q) '[was] a constitutional exercise of Congress'
well-defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and
the 'business' of elementary, middle and high schools... affects
interstate commerce.' '" Subsequently waiving his right to a jury trial,
Lopez was convicted and sentenced to six months in prison and two
years of supervision.9'
The most surprising turning point in the case prior to the Supreme
Court's final adjudication came upon Lopez's appeal, in which Judge
Garwood of the Fifth Circuit found that the application of the Act in the
instant case did indeed exceed congressional authority under the
Constitution.92 Stopping short of striking down the act altogether, the
court explained:
Congress has not done what is necessary to locate section 922(q)
within the Commerce Clause. And, we expressly do not resolve
the question whether section 922(q) can ever be constitutionally
applied. Conceivably, a conviction under section 922(q) might be
sustained if the government alleged and proved that the offense
had a nexus to commerce.
93
Hence, the court wisely deferred to the Supreme Court the
determination of whether section 922(q) could in fact be constitutionally
87. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (Supp. V 1993). "The term 'school zone' is defined as 'in, or on
the grounds of, a public, parochial or private school' or 'within a distance of 1,000 feet from
the grounds of a public, parochial or private school." United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
551 n.1 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25)(Supp. V 1993)).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
89. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
90. Id. at 551-52 (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 552.
92. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993). Judge Garwood also noted that
this was a matter of first impression in the federal courts. Id. at 1345.
93. Id. at 1368.
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applied through the use of an indictment alleging a "nexus to
commerce,"' 94 thus correcting the congressional omission of Commerce
Clause language from the text of the statute. Nonetheless, with that
caveat, the court went on to hold that "section 922(q), in the full reach
of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause."95
After the Fifth Circuit denied the federal prosecutor an en banc
hearing,96 the Supreme Court granted certiorari.' Following an
overview of the relevant history of the Commerce Clause, the Court
asserted that, though the commerce power is now broad, it has never
been conceded that it is without limits.98 The Court then outlined three
areas of regulation that have traditionally been permitted as proper
exercises of congressional authority:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons
or things in interstate commerce .... Finally, Congress'
commerce authority includes the power to regulate those
activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce,
i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.99
94. Id. At this point in the history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it indeed seemed
wise for a lower federal court to defer the ultimate question to the Supreme Court.
Considering the fact that it had been close to sixty years since any federal statute was struck
down under the Commerce Clause, it is no surprise that the Fifth Circuit was wary of placing
boundaries on the then apparently plenary congressional power to legislate under the
Commerce Clause. See discussion of the history of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, supra
Part II.
95. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1367-68.
96. United States v. Lopez, 9 F.3d 105 (1993) (mem.).
97. United States v. Lopez, 511 U.S. 1029 (1994) (mem.).
98. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-58 (1995). The Court pointed outlanguage in a number of decisions that reserved the right to limit congressional power under
the Commerce Clause. Most notably, the Court quoted J&L Steel:
[T]he scope of the interstate commerce power "must be considered in the light of
our dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects
upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of
our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is
national and what is local and create a completely centralized government."
Id. at 557 (quoting NLRB v. J&L Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
99. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
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The Court first summarily dismissed the applicability of the first two
prongs of this analysis to the case at hand.'O° Admitting that its previous
cases were not always clear as to how much of an effect on interstate
commerce is a substantial effect, the majority nevertheless reaffirmed
the substantial-effects test as the proper tool to utilize in determining
the constitutionality of regulations under the Commerce Clause.''
The Court also reaffirmed its use of the aggregate-effects theory, as
originally set forth in Wickard, as the correct method of determining
whether a particular activity has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.0 2 However, it is at this point in the analysis where the Court
deviated from precedent and drew a distinction between Lopez's case
and those that came before: "Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most
far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate
activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun
in a school zone does not."0 3
The Court continued by developing this crucial distinction. Whereas
the activity in Wickard, though local and diminutive compared to the
national market, was nevertheless economic, the GFSZA had "nothing
to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms.""' The Court also pointed out
that the Act is not even an essential portion of a larger economic
regulatory framework "in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were [also] regulated[,""' as was
the case in Maryland v. Wirtz.1°6
100. The Court stated:
We now turn to consider the power of Congress, in the light of this framework, to
enact § 922(q). The first two categories of authority may be quickly disposed of: §
922(q) is not a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, nor is it
an attempt to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the
channels of commerce; nor can § 922(q) be justified as a regulation by which
Congress has sought to protect an instrumentality of interstate commerce or a thing
in interstate commerce. Thus, if § 922(q) is to be sustained, it must be under the




102. Id. at 556.
103. Id. at 560.
104. Id. at 561.
105. Id.
106. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
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Pointing out that nowhere in the GFSZA is language denoting ajurisdictional element "which would ensure, through case-by-case
inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce[,]' ' 7 the Court concluded that, at the very least, such
language is necessary to determine whether the statute applies in a
particular circumstance.' Thus, the Court addressed the Fifth Circuit's
question as to whether the statute could be constitutionally applied if
the indictment alleged a sufficient nexus between the activity and
interstate commerce. The Court compared Lopez's situation with the
situation in United States v. Bass,'O' which challenged a federal statute
that made possession, reception, or transportation of a firearm in
commerce a crime."' The crucial distinction between the two cases
according to the Court was that the statutory language under scrutiny in
Bass contained jurisdictional language, while section 922 did not."' In
fact, the Court overturned the conviction in Bass because the
government had failed to prove the jurisdictional element."2 With the
Court finding no such jurisdictional limitation in section 922, the
statutory language "[left] no reasonable alternative" but to rule it an
unconstitutional exercise of power."3
The Court then noted that, although Congress is not required to
present "formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity
has on interstate commerce[,]"" 4 such findings nevertheless would have
been helpful in determining whether the GFSZA can ever be
constitutionally applied under Wickard's aggregate-affects theory."'
Nevertheless, the government presented a line of reasoning that the
Court labeled "cost of crime" and "national productivity" logic."6 In
essence, the government argued that, in the aggregate, crime adversely
affects interstate commerce because of the economic damage to its
107. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
108. Id.
109. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
110. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (explaining the holding of Bass).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (explicating the method of review of statutes under constitutional scrutiny: "Theprinciple is old and deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that this Court will construe a
statute in a manner that requires decision of serious constitutional questions only if the
statutory language leaves no reasonable alternative" (citation omitted)).
114. Id. at 562.
115. Id. at 563.
116. Id. at 564.
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victims."7 Furthermore, the government posited that guns in school
zones destroy the nurturing educational environment, making children
learn less and thereby affecting the productivity of the nation."' The
Court rejected this reasoning:
Under the theories that the Government presents in support of §
922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power,
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education
where States historically have been sovereign. Thus, if we were
to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power
to regulate."9
Thus, just as the GFSZA statute is facially unconstitutional, it is also
unconstitutional as applied.
B. United States v. Morrison
What Congress took away from the Lopez decision was the idea that
it must have some concrete proof that the particular regulated activity
has an interstate attribute that provides the necessary nexus between the
activity itself and interstate commerce as a whole.2 It began to make
sure that hearings and studies on the subject were performed en masse
prior to the enactment of laws purportedly authorized under the
Commerce Clause.' However, the Court again struck down a federal
law in United States v. Morrison" in 2000, despite a congressional
showing of proof that the law was connected to interstate commerce,
stating: "[Tihe existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by
itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation." 
,11
Shocking many legal scholars for the second time in five years, the
Court again embraced a limitation on congressional commerce power by
reaffirming the holding of Lopez.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. The Court later labeled this method "but-for" reasoning. See United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
120. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (recognizing that the statute in question was
supported by numerous congressional findings).
121. See, e.g., id.
122. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
123. Id. at 614.
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The challenge in Morrison was to the constitutionality of a portion
of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), which granted a
federal civil remedy to the victims of gender-motivated violence.14 The
Court began its analysis in Morrison by recapitulating the tenet that,
though expansive, Congress's commerce power is not wholly plenary, as
some had previously believed.25 The Court then turned to the three-
pronged analysis identified in Lopez and, once again, summarily
dismissed the applicability of the first two categories of regulation.'26 In
deciding whether the VAWA regulates an activity that substantially
affects interstate commerce, the Court found four factors that were key
to the substantial-effects analysis in Lopez that were likewise integral to
the analysis in Morrison: (1) a statute must by its terms have something
to do with "'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms" ;2' (2) the statute must contain an
express jurisdictional element "'which might limit its reach to a discrete
set of [offenses] that additionally have an explicit connection with or
effect on interstate commerce'";' 2' (3) the existence of legislative
findings that the regulated activity actually affects interstate
commerce; 2 9 and (4) that the link between the offense and interstate
commerce is not so attenuated through the use of "but-for" reasoning as
to make the connection trivial."30
The Court continued by applying these principles to the VAWA,
concluding that "the proper resolution of the present cases is clear."' 3'
The VAWA fails on the first two factors in the analysis, in that
"[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity[J,132 and the statute itself contains nojurisdictional element "establishing that the federal cause of action is in
pursuance of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. 133
124. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
125. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608. See Gottovi, supra note 25, at 688 (noting that "[c]ases
were decided so consistently in favor of expansive congressional commerce power that
commentators often considered any legislation passed under the Commerce Clause to be per
se constitutional").
126. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609; see also supra note 100 and accompanying text.
127. Id. at 610-11 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)).
128. Id. at 611-12 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
129. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
130. Id. at 612-13.
131. Id. at 613.
132. Id.
133. Id. Instead, "Congress elected to cast § 13981's remedy over a wider, and more
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However, the Court was forced to acknowledge the voluminous
legislative findings presented by the government in support of the third
substantial effects factor.3 The Court chose to ignore these findings as
irrelevant, however, stating: "[T]he existence of congressional findings is
not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce
Clause legislation."''  These findings must, in turn, rely on something
other than the "but-for" reasoning previously rejected as untenable in
Lopez so as not to demolish the "Constitution's distinction between
national and local authority... ,136 In turning down the government's
arguments on this point, the Court reiterated the central concern that
produced the Lopez decision:
[T]he but-for causal chain.., would allow Congress to regulate
any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that
crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit,
or consumption. Indeed, if Congress may regulate gender-
motivated violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any
other type of violence since gender- motivated violence, as a
subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic
impacts than the larger class of which it is a part.
Petitioners' reasoning, moreover, will not limit Congress to
regulating violence but may, as we suggested in Lopez, be
applied equally as well to family law and other areas of
traditional state regulation since the aggregate effect of marriage,
divorce, and childrearing on the national economy is
undoubtedly significant. Congress may have recognized this
specter when it expressly precluded § 13981 from being used in
the family law context. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e)(4). 37
In essence, the Court condemned such laws as destroying the very
purely intrastate, body of violent crime." Id.
134. Id. at 614.
135. Id. at 614. The Court quoted Lopez:
[Slimply because Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially
affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so. "Rather, [w]hether
particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to come under the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate them is ultimately a judicial rather than
a legislative question, and can be settled finally only by this Court."
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
136. Id. at 615.
137. Id. at 615-16.
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essence of federalism, as formulated via the Commerce Clause, by
obviating the need for a distinction between what is truly local and what
is truly national.' When directed solely at intrastate activities, the
punishment of violent crimes by the federal government does precisely
this: "Indeed, we can think of no better example of the police power,
which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in
the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its
victims. "139
C. Wonders or Blunders?
Although Morrison's language is perhaps a bit more forceful than
that found in Lopez, the only real difference between the two cases is
the Court's lack of receptivity to congressional findings, despite the
implication in Lopez that such findings would be helpful. Morrison also
served to crystallize the four subparts of the substantial-effects analysis.
Apart from that, Morrison seemingly leaves the three-prong Lopez
analysis intact." These two cases, taken together, have wrought a major
change in Commerce Clause jurisprudence. However, potentially the
most significant change stemming from Lopez is not the newfound
"teeth" of the substantial-effects test. Rather, it comes from the Court's
formulation of the three categories of commercial regulation in which
Congress may permissibly engage.' As pointed out above, the Court
virtually ignored the first two prongs of the analysis, quickly passing
over them in order to get to the substantial-effects analysis in both
Lopez and Morrison.'42 The question, then, is why the Court did this.
The answer, evident within the case law cited in the Lopez decision
itself, is that since 1937 the Court had always done this. The first two
prongs of Lopez's Commerce Clause inquiry can be traced back to
formulas composed by the Court prior to J&L Steel's institution of the
substantial-effects test as the paramount method of Commerce Clause
analysis.'43 However, as illustrated by the very cases the Court cited in
138. Id. at 616-17.
139. Id. at 618.
140. But see United States v. King, No. 5100 Cr. 653 (RWS) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1120(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2001) (implying that Morrison actually served to make the first two prongs
of the Lopez analysis subordinate to an overarching substantial-effects analysis). See also
infra text accompanying and following notes 228-33.
141. See supra text accompanying note 99.
142. See supra notes 100, 126 and accompanying text.
143. See generally supra Part II (outlining the relevant history of Commerce Clause
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Lopez, these categories of regulation have since been subsumed under
and incorporated into the substantial-effects test in the years that
followed.1"
One of the key underpinnings of Congress's plenary commerce
power between 1937 and 1995 was that the Court would not specifically
require a commercial motivation for the law. For example, in United
States v. Darby, the Court stated that "[t]he motive and purpose of a
regulation of interstate commerce are matters for the legislative
judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no
restriction and over which the courts are given no control. " 14' As long as
there was some rational standard upon which to base the regulation the
Court would allow the legislation as constitutional.16  Having
established this, the Court would then draw heavily on prior Commerce
Clause decisions to identify a rational commercial justification for the
law in question. Once having done so, the Court would go on to apply
the substantial-effects test to discover whether such rationale was
actually fulfilled.
1. Channels
The first prong of the Lopez test is that "Congress may regulate the
use of the channels of interstate commerce."'147 In support of this
assertion, the Court cited United States v. Darby,'48 Heart of Atlanta
Motel' 49 and Caminetti v. United States." The oldest of these three,
Caminetti, is a relatively obscure case as far as Commerce Clause
jurisprudence is concerned. Decided in 1917, it predates the extensive
jurisprudence).
144. See infra Part III.C.
145. 321 U.S. 100, 115 (1941). See also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964), in which the Court stated:
The commerce power invoked here by the Congress is a specific and plenary one
authorized by the Constitution itself. The only questions are: (1) whether Congress
had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimination by motels affected
commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis, whether the means it selected to eliminate
that evil are reasonable and appropriate.
Id. (emphasis added).
146. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
147. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
148. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
149. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
150. 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
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use of the substantial-effects test and is the direct progeny of the Lottery
Case.5 ' Indeed, Caminetti cited the Lottery Case in finding that "the
authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free
from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is
no longer open to question.""15 As such, the holding in this case is
indeed predicated on the very concept identified as the first prong of the
Lopez analysis: that Congress can constitutionally regulate the channels
of interstate commerce.
Darby, the first of the other two cases, concerned a challenge to the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, a New Deal program that prohibited
the shipment in interstate commerce goods manufactured under unfair
working conditions.' This case was decided in 1941, four years after
J&L Steel re-instituted the substantial-effects test, and as such makes
extensive use of that opinion in its holding:
[I]t does not follow that Congress may not by appropriate
legislation regulate intrastate activities where they have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce .... A recent example
is the National Labor Relations Act, for the regulation of
employer and employee relations in industries in which strikes,
induced by unfair labor practices named in the Act, tend to
disturb or obstruct interstate commerce. See National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 38,
40. But long before the adoption of the National Labor Relations
Act this Court had many times held that the power of Congress
151. For a discussion of the Lottery Case and its other progeny, see supra notes 53-55
and accompanying text.
152. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491. Caminetti actually dealt with the White Slave Traffic
Act of 1910, the same act already found constitutional in Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308(1913). See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. In Caminetti, the Court states:
Moreover, this act has been sustained against objections affecting its
constitutionality of the character now urged. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308;
Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U.S. 326; Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563. In
the Hoke Case, the constitutional objections were given consideration and denied
upon grounds fully stated in the opinion (pp. 308 et seq.). It is true that the
particular case arose from a prosecution of one charged with transporting a woman
for the purposes of prostitution in violation of the act. But, holding as we do, that
the purposes and practices for which the transportation in these cases was procured
are equally within the denunciation of the act, what was said in the Hoke Case as to
the power of Congress over the subject is as applicable now as it was then.
242 U.S. at 491-92.
153. Darby, 312 U.S. at 109.
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to regulate interstate commerce extends to the regulation
through legislative action of activities intrastate which have a
substantial effect on the commerce or the exercise of the
Congressional power over it. 54
The Court in Darby predicated its analysis on the precept that
Congress could constitutionally regulate the channels of interstate
commerce. Thereby, the wholly intrastate activities that had a
substantial effect on the use of those channels were subject to regulation
as well. The "channels" argument represented the justification, while
the substantial-effects test provided the mechanism through which that
justification was fulfilled. Consequently, this case actually represents a
melding of the two standards, rather than an explication of a distinct and
separate standard, as Lopez seems to indicate.
Heart of Atlanta Motel exhibits a similar dynamic. The Lopez Court
held this case out as an example of congressional regulation of the
channels of interstate commerce."' And yet, as discussed above,56 the
ultimate holding of this case is based on a substantial-effects analysis:
"Thus the power of Congress to promote' interstate commerce also
includes the power to regulate the local incidents thereof, including local
activities in both the States of origin and destination, which might have a
substantial and harmful effect upon that commerce." '' 7 Once again,
Congress's regulation of intrastate activity is excused by virtue of that
activity's substantial effect on interstate commerce. As such, Congress
is justified in imposing such regulation by its ability to, in turn, regulate
the use of the channels of interstate commerce.
While Darby and Heart of Atlanta can be seen as falling within the
first prong of the Lopez analysis, they cannot be seen exclusively as
such. These cases represent the appropriation of previous Commerce
Clause precedents, such as Caminetti, to lend justification to the use of
the substantial-effects test, thereby allowing Congress to constitutionally
reach wholly intrastate activities.
2. Instrumentalities
The second prong of the Lopez analysis stated: "Congress is
154. Id. at 119-20 (non-essential citations omitted).
155. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
156. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
157. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964).
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empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the
threat may come only from intrastate activities."'58 Again the Court
cited three cases, this time with two predating J&L Steel. The first of
these was Southern Railway Co. v. United States,'59 which upheld a law
"intended to embrace all locomotives, cars and similar vehicles used on
any railroad which is a highway of interstate commerce."160 As such, this
case dealt with the regulation of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. However, the Lopez Court neglected to cite the following
passage, in which the Southern Railway Court posited:
Is there such a close or direct relation or connection between the
[intrastate and interstate] classes of traffic, when moving over the
same railroad, as to make it certain that the safety of the
interstate traffic and of those who are employed in its movement
will be promoted in a real or substantial sense by applying the
requirements of these acts to vehicles used in moving the traffic
which is intrastate as well as to those used in moving that which
is interstate?.6'
Answering its own question, the Court stated:
[T]his is so, not because Congress possesses any power to
regulate intrastate commerce as such, but because its power to
regulate interstate commerce is plenary and competently may be
exerted to secure the safety of the persons and property
transported therein and of those who are employed in such
transportation, no matter what may be the source of the dangers
which threaten it.162
Hence, even in this early example, the Court was actually using a
version of the substantial-effects doctrine to uphold the regulation of a
wholly intrastate activity. As in the "channels" cases, the justification
for this is the constitutional mandate to Congress to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. This is born out by the
158. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
159. 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
160. Id. at 26.
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 26-27.
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Lopez Court's subsequent citation to the Shreveport Rates Case, which,
as discussed above, was the seminal case that introduced the substantial-
effects test into the mainstream of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.63
The third case cited, Perez v. United States,"' was decided several
years after J&L Steel and, like the previous two cases, contemplated
Congress's power to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and the things within them. "The Commerce
Clause reaches .... [the] protection of the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, as, for example, the destruction of an aircraft, or persons or
things in commerce, as, for example, thefts from interstate shipments."16 S
However, the majority of the Commerce Clause analysis in Perez did
not actually address the "instrumentalities" justification. Instead, the
Court, just as in Lopez, merely stated the standard and moved on to a
pure substantial-effects analysis.'66
3. Substantial-Effects
If anything, the Perez case serves only to amplify the predominance
of the substantial-effects test in the realm of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, as well as the fact that the substantial-effects test has
become its own justification for regulation under the Commerce Clause.
However, as illustrated by the analysis above, it is not the case that the
first and second prongs themselves are also stand-alone bases for
regulation. In fact, it is just the opposite; according to the precedents
the Court itself cited in Lopez and discussed above, regulations justified
through the first two prongs must then be customarily subjected to the
substantial-effects test.
Even a cursory examination of these cases can lead only to the
conclusion that the first two prongs of the Lopez analysis have, since
1937, been subsumed by the overarching analytical structure of the
substantial-effects test. While it is true that the Court has drawn this
three-pronged division before in cases such as Perez, it is not true that
163. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text. As noted above, the Shreveport
Rates Case also used the protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce as
justification of its application of the substantial effects test. Id.
164. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
165. Id. at 150 (citation omitted).
166. Id. at 151-57.
167. An examination of Perez reveals that the three-prong test asserted in Lopez is not
original to that case:
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those cases came to represent a fundamental change in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence as Lopez has. By misstating its precedents in what
it must have known would be an important, well-publicized, and oft-
cited case, the Court has opened up the potential for Commerce Clause-
based regulations that, for the first time in over sixty years, need not be
subjected to the substantial-effects test. Just as the Lopez Court began
to require more rigorous scrutiny of statutes passed under the
substantial-effects justification, it simultaneously provided a loophole
via standards that were heretofore subsumed and incorporated into the
substantial-effects analytical framework.
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems. First, the
use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which Congress deems are being
misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen goods or of persons who have been
kidnapped. Second, protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as
for example, the destruction of an aircraft, or persons or things in commerce, as, for
example, thefts from interstate shipments. Third, those activities affecting
commerce.
Id. at 150 (citations omitted); see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981) (reiterating the three-part analysis set forth in Perez).
Indeed, the Lopez Court recognizes it as unoriginal to Lopez. See United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 529, 558 (1995).
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IV. THE LOWER FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND THE CSRA'68
Previous commentators have noted that the Lopez "opinion's pro-
federalist strength" has been undermined by the Court's failure to offer
a "clearly heightened level of scrutiny as an alternative to. . . broad
precedents."'69 However, the theory presented in this Comment-that
Lopez actually misstates Commerce Clause jurisprudence in such a way
as to allow the lower federal judiciary to escape having to apply the new,
more rigorous substantial-effects analysis-has yet to be advanced.
While one might suspect that federal courts, required for the last sixty
years to apply the substantial-effects test, would continue to do so, the
opposite is the case. The analytical shortcomings of Lopez outlined
above have already been exploited, as amply illustrated by the slew of
cases in the lower federal judiciary centered on the constitutionality of
168. It is important to recognize at this point that the following discussion is not
purported to be a determination of whether the CSRA is or is not constitutional. Instead, the
scope of this Comment deals solely with how CSRA rulings in federal courts have served to
highlight the perceived deficiencies in constitutional interpretation exhibited by Lopez and
discussed in depth in Part III.C.
With that caveat in mind, it is nevertheless instructive to point out that the circuit court
opinions discussed in this section deal exclusively with the 1992 version of the CSRA. See
supra note 20 (quoting the text of 18 U.S.C. § 288(a) (Supp. V 1993)). Much of the circuit
court disagreement in these cases revolved around the fact that the 1992 version of the statute
contained no reference whatsoever to interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey,
115 F.3d 1222, 1226 (5th Cir. 1997). The opposing argument is that this omission can be
corrected by recognizing the fact that the statute operates only when the parent resides in a
different state than the child. See id. The 1998 version, however, divides the "offense"
portion of the statute into three separate provisions, the second of which does contain an
explicit reference to interstate commerce. See supra note 20 (quoting the text of 18 U.S.C. §
288(a)(2) (Supp. V 1993) (making it a crime to travel "in interstate commerce ... with the
intent to evade a child support obligation")). Thus, it is entirely possible that Congress has at
least partially corrected the difficulties that gave rise to all of the litigation cited herein in the
first place.
However, the viability of the discussion herein is unaffected by this for two reasons.
First, the first and third provisions of § 288(a), as currently formulated, are separate offenses
than that promulgated in subsection 2 (in that the three provisions are disjunctive) and still
contain no reference to interstate commerce. As such, these portions of the Act continue to
be susceptible to Commerce Clause challenges. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
613 (2000) (noting that a statute promulgated pursuant to the Commerce Clause should
contain at least a jurisdictional element "establishing that the federal cause of action is in
pursuance of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce."). Second, and more
importantly, the constitutionality of the CSRA is not properly within the purview of this
Comment, as expressed in the caveat above. Whether or not the Supreme Court ultimately
vindicates the arguments within these cases is therefore immaterial, in that they would
continue to highlight the complexities injected into Commerce Clause interpretations by
Lopez's three-prong test.
169. Gottovi, supra note 25, at 700-01.
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the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA)."7 '
Within two years after the Lopez decision was handed down, ten out
of the eleven numbered circuits were required to decide upon its
constitutionality under the Commerce Clause; in each, the statute was
upheld.7' The Sixth Circuit, however, handed down its final CSRA
opinion, with results similar to the previous cases, in 2001.172 What is
crucial to this discussion is that all but three circuits made little or no
attempt at justifying the CSRA via an application of the substantial-
effects test."' Of those three that did attempt a substantial-effects
analysis, none justified the statute solely by that rationale.'74 Of the
courts that found for constitutionality under the first or second prong of
the analysis, all followed Lopez's lead in misstating, and consequently
completely ignoring, the import of the earlier Supreme Court
precedents. Instead, time and again, the CSRA was upheld as
constitutional as either a proper regulation of the channels of interstate
170. For the text of the CSRA before and after its 1998 amendments and a discussion of
the difference between them, see supra notes 20 and 168.
171. See United States v. Williams, 121 F.3d 615 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1065 (1998) (holding the CSRA constitutional under the second prong of the Lopez analysis);
United States v. Black, 125 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1033 (1998)
(holding the CSRA constitutional under the second prong of the Lopez analysis); United
States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 934 (1997) (holding
the CSRA constitutional under all three prongs of the Lopez analysis); United States v.
Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082 (1998) (holding the CSRA
constitutional under the first and second prongs of the Lopez analysis); United States v.
Johnson, 114 F.3d 476 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 904 (1997) (holding the CSRA
constitutional under the second prong of the Lopez analysis); United States v. Parker, 108
F.3d 28 (3rd Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 837 (1997) (agreeing with the analyses of
Mussari, Sage, and Hampshire as to the second prong of the Lopez analysis, and additionally
holding the CSRA constitutional under the third prong); United States v. Bongiorno, 106
F.3d 1027 (1st Cir. 1997), rehg denied, 110 F.3d 132 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding the CSRA
constitutional under the second prong of the Lopez analysis); United States v. Mussari, 95
F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1203 (1997) (holding the CSRA constitutional
under the second prong of the Lopez analysis); United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999 (10th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1084 (1997) (holding the CSRA constitutional under the
second and third prongs of the Lopez analysis); United States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2nd Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1099 (1997) (holding the CSRA constitutional under the second
prong of the Lopez analysis).
172. United States v. Faasse, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Faasse If], revg en
banc, 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000(holding the CSRA constitutional under the first and second
prongs of the Lopez analysis, and stating in dicta that it is constitutional under the third as
well). This case overruled a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit, which held the CSRA
unconstitutional in 2000. See infra, text accompanying notes 219-25.
173. See Faasse 11, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2000); supra note 171.
174. See supra note 171.
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commerce or of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, without
subjecting it to the previously mandatory substantial-effects analysis."'
A. Channels of Interstate Commerce
In three of the circuits, the courts have held that the CSRA can in
fact be supported under the first prong of the Lopez analysis.' The
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bailey,"' responding to Bailey's
argument that the Act's jurisdictional nexus requirement "is simply a
condition precedent guaranteeing only the diversity of state residence
that does not, on its face, implicate interstate commerce[,] " began by
ceding the point that mere diversity of residence is not enough to invoke
the congressional commerce power."' The court noted:
Bailey is correct in his premise that the diversity of residence
between parent and child alone is insufficient to bestow upon
Congress the power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. If
we were to so hold, we would unwittingly open the floodgates to
allowing Congress to regulate any and all activity it so desired,
even those activities traditionally reserved for state
regulation .... "o
However, the court pointed out that the CSRA also requires a child
support obligation created by a state court order in order to become
applicable.'' The court went on to say that, once Bailey moved out of
the state in which his child lived, he necessarily must make use of the
channels of interstate commerce, either via the mail or electronic
means,182 as there is no other way to get the money from a parent in one
175. See, e.g., Bongiorno, 106 F.3d at 1033 (noting that "we have no occasion to decide
whether unpaid child support substantially affects interstate commerce"); Sage, 92 F.3d at 107
("None of the concerns expressed in the Lopez opinion is at stake in this case."); Johnson,
114 F.3d at 479 ("Looking to these three possible sources of Commerce Clause power to
enact the CSRA, we pass categor[y] ... (3) ('activities substantially affecting interstate
commerce')... "); Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1226 ("We decline to reach the question whether the
CSRA may also be upheld under the third category [of the Lopez analysis].").
176. See Faasse 11, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d 1397
(8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997).
177. 115 F.3d 1222 (5th Cir. 1997).




182. See id. at 1226-27 (noting that the channels of interstate commerce refer to "the
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state to the child in another.""
The Sixth Circuit echoed Bailey in its decision of United States v.
Faasse"' Citing Lopez's references to Heart of Atlanta Motel and
Darby, the court stated: "These cases teach that Congress has the
power, under category one [of the Lopez analysis], to regulate or
exclude certain categories of goods from flowing.., through the
channels of commerce."'8 5  Apparently, this court concurred with the
idea propounded in Bailey that, since payments necessarily move
through the channels of interstate commerce, they can be (albeit
loosely) considered "goods" and are therefore subject to regulation
under the first prong of the Lopez analysis.
B. Instrumentalities of, or Persons or Things in, Interstate Commerce
The lion's share of argumentation over the CSRA's constitutionality
has been over whether it regulates the instrumentalities of, or persons or
things in, interstate commerce. The vast majority of circuits have
upheld the CSRA under this prong of the Lopez analysis, and there are
several distinct issues that arise within it. The first, and perhaps most
important of these issues, is whether child support obligations can
themselves be considered "things" in interstate commerce. Many of the
courts note that the Supreme Court considers intangibles, such as
support obligations, as things properly the subject of the commerce
power.'86 Furthermore, a support obligation constitutes a thing in
interstate transportation routes through which persons and goods move." (quoting United
States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1995)). See also supra note 57 for a
discussion of how the concept of "channels" of interstate commerce has evolved from
tangible conceptions, such as roads or railroads, to other, less tangible means of interstate
travel, such as telephone and other telecommunications services.
183. Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1227; accord, Crawford, 115 F.3d at 1400 (noting that "payment
of child support on behalf of an out-of-state child requires the use of channels of interstate
commerce, which renders the CSRA constitutional under the first Lopez category as well").
184. Faasse 11, 265 F.3d at 489-90.
185. Id. at 490.
186. See, e.g., id. at 486. The court stated:
It matters not, for purposes of the Constitution, whether the child support payment
is a tangible thing. In South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. at 546... in which
the Supreme Court upheld Congress's authority to regulate interstate insurance
contracts, the Court made clear that "Congress can regulate traffic though it consist
of intangibles."
Id.; see also United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1022, 1031 (1st Cir. 1997) (citing United
States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 226 (1955)).
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commerce because it is satisfied "by a payment that will normally move
in interstate commerce .... "187
The most succinct and widely cited argument on this point is the one
advanced by the Second Circuit in United States v. Sage.' The court
noted that on several occasions, the Supreme Court has ruled that
contracts for interstate sales constitute transactions in commerce."9 The
Sage court went on to state: "In the present case the obligation stems
from a court order, not a contract, but the principle is the same."' "0 This
sentiment has been echoed by a variety of other circuits."' Hence, the
Faasse II court agreed with the Sage court's association of child support
obligations with interstate transactions in general:
The power confined to Congress by the Commerce Clause is
declared in The Federalist to be for the purpose of securing the
'maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the
States." ... It is the power to legislate concerning transactions
which, reaching across state boundaries, affect the people of
more states than one;-to govern affairs which the individual
states-with their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not fully
capable of governing.'9'
When expanded as such, the association between child support
obligations and "transactions which[] reach[] across state boundaries '
leads the circuits to the next pillar of their argument; Congress is acting
within its right in that it must step in where state courts' efforts to
enforce their own child support orders fail. As the Sage court put it:
187. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d at 1031 (quoting United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790
(9th Cir. 1996)).
188. 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996).
189. Id. at 106 (citing Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921)
(holding a Kentucky law preventing the enforcement of an interstate contract invalid under
the Dormant Commerce Clause); see also Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 515
(1923) ("contracts" for interstate sales are "interstate commerce in its essence")).
190. Sage, 92 F.3d at 106.
191. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d 476, 480 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Sage);
United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222, 1229 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[a]lthough the
instant case involves an obligation arising from a court order, not a contract, the premise is
the same...").
192. Faasse 11, 265 F.3d 475, 484 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 551-52 (1944)).




The fact that, because of the nature of our Federal system, [theState] was unable effectively to enforce [the child support]
obligation does not mean that it did not exist or had somehow
vanished. All the Act does is enable the United States to help[the State] do what it could not do on its own, namely, enforceSage's obligation to send money from one State to another. 94
In support of this justification for the CSRA, the circuits commonly
cited the Judiciary Committee's report that "'the annual deficit in child
support payments remains unacceptably high,' especially 'in interstate
collection cases, where enforcement of support is particularly
difficult,' ""9 and "interstate extradition and enforcement in fact remains
a tedious, cumbersome, and slow method of collection. .. .""' Several
of the cases also quote Congressman Henry Hyde's concern over
delinquent parents "'mak[ing] a mockery of State law by fleeing across
State lines to avoid enforcement actions by State courts and child
support agencies.'"'97
Hence, interstate support obligations, as things in commerce, are
necessarily subject to congressional regulation, according to the second
prong of the Lopez analysis. 98  As such, the courts have drawn the
conclusion that the CSRA is analogous to other federal statutes that are
meant to foster the growth of interstate commerce.199 Even though the
194. Sage, 92 F.3d at 105. See also Faasse H, 265 F.3d at 485.
195. United States v. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1030 (1st Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
196. Id. (citations omitted).
197. Id. (citations omitted); see also Sage, 92 F.3d at 103-04 (quoting the same language
from Congressman Hyde).
198. See, e.g., United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1003 (10th Cir. 1996).
199. See, e.g., Sage, 92 F.3d at 105. The Sage court noted:
Sage argues that the Act is not within the Commerce Clause power and thus invalid
on its face because it concerns not the sending of money interstate but the failure to
send money.
Such reasoning would mean that Congress would have no power to prohibit a
monopoly so complete as to thwart all other interstate commerce in a line of trade.
Yet the Sherman Act, ... is within the Commerce Clause power. To accept Sage's
reasoning would disable the United States from punishing under the Hobbs Act,
making it a crime to "obstruct" interstate commerce, someone who successfully
prevented interstate trade by extortion and murder. There would be no trade to
obstruct.
Id. (citations omitted); see also United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1996)(noting that a delinquent parent's "intentional refusal to satisfy the debt is as much an
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Act criminalizes the failure to engage in interstate commerce (by not
making the required payments), Congress can nevertheless pass
regulations in order to "prevent [this] frustration of an obligation to
engage in commerce. "(0
Consequently, the argument made by many CSRA defendants-
that, since the obligations arise out of family law, their regulation must
traditionally be reserved to the states via the Tenth Amendment-has
not been looked upon with favor in the circuit courts:
This circumstance is fribbling .... [A]lthough the underlying
child support order is a product of state law, the delinquent
parent's location vis-a-vis the minor child creates interstate nexus
in the form of an obligation to make regular payments across
state boundaries. Indeed, the CSRA applies only when the state-
imposed child support order develops an interstate
character.... 
The key to this argument, according to the Bailey court, is that the
federal district courts are not required by the CSRA to issue family law
decrees or to amend orders already made by state courts. The Fifth
Circuit maintained that "[f]ederal courts have long divested themselves
of jurisdiction over only the issuance of divorce, alimony, and child
custody decrees, finding that such domestic relations matters are within
the unique province of state courts to decide. "0 However, "[t]he CSRA
in no way endeavors to regulate this hallowed ground; it seeks merely to
enforce a child support order already promulgated by a state court."2 3
V. SYNTHESIS
As already stated, the above-cited opinions of the circuit courts
rarely attempted to undergo a substantial-effects scrutiny in order to
uphold the CSRA.2°4 Those that did espoused many of the same
obstruction of commerce between the states as any act of extortion made unlawful by the
Hobbs Act.").
200. Sage, 92 F.3d at 105-06.
201. Bongiorno, 106 F.3d at 1032.
202. United States v. Bailey, 115 F.3d 1222,1231 (5th Cir. 1997).
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1003-1004 (10th Cir. 1996);
United States v. Parker 108 F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Crawford, 115 F.3d
1397, 1400 (8th Cir. 1997).
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formulations of the test that are routinely used in rubber-stamping
statutes passed under the aegis of the Commerce Clause and approved
via the minimal scrutiny of rational basis review. 5 It is, therefore, not
clear as to how these courts would apply the substantial-effects test if
forced to do so seriously. However, it is clear that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of its precedents in Lopez has allowed the lower federaljudiciary to skirt the serious application of a substantial-effects analysis.
If it were true to its precedents, the Court would have required that,
once a justification for the CSRA had been established, it would yet
have to be subjected to the substantial-effects formula spelled out in
Lopez and clarified by Morrison.
There are two prime examples of serious applications of the
substantial-effects test to the CSRA. The first, a pre-Morrison
application of the substantial-effects analysis, is found in Judge Jerry
Smith's dissent to the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Bailey.2 O
Judge Smith stated:
[The CSRA] contains no reference to interstate commerce,
regulates an activity that is not commercial, and invades the field
of family law, a traditional area of exclusive state sovereignty.
Therefore, I conclude that [the CSRA] flouts the limitations on
the Commerce Clause, flies in the face of Lopez, and threatens to
"obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is
local and create a completely centralized government."2' 7
Thus, in using language directly from the Lopez decision, Judge
Smith addressed several of the factors identified in Lopez as pertinent
to whether a given regulation is permissible under a substantial-effects
analysis. First, the CSRA contains no jurisdictional nexus, in that it
does not require the use of the channels of interstate commerce "as a
prerequisite to federal regulation... 'which would ensure, through a
case-by-case inquiry, that the [activity] in question affects interstate
commerce[.] '"'2  Second, the Act does not regulate a commercial
205. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. For a convincing recitation of the idea
that the lower federal judiciary is continuing to decide Commerce Clause cases in general,
and CSRA cases in particular, according to the minimal scrutiny standards customarily
applied in Commerce Clause challenges, see Gottovi, supra note 25, at 719-21. See also
Sentelle, supra note 22.
206. 115 F.3d 1222, 1233-40 (5th Cir. 1997) (Smith, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1233 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995)).
208. Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1238 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). For this factor as
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activity, in that child support obligations are not commercial, bilateral
transactions."9 Instead, Judge Smith contended, they are unilateral, and
as such include none of the elements of actual commerce.210 Thus, child
support payments lack the necessary "relationship to trade and
commercial intercourse, '" 211 effectively transforming the "Interstate
Commerce Clause [into the] Interstate Clause. ,
2 12
Judge Smith continued by applying the last two factors identified in
Lopez and Morrison as to whether a given regulation is permissible
under a substantial-effects analysis.2" With enviable prescience, he
intuited the portion of Morrison disregarding the voluminous legislative
findings in that case2. 4 and the fact that the findings must rely on
something other than the "but-for" reasoning previously rejected by
Lopez:
In Lopez, the Supreme Court disavowed the use of speculative
economic theories to prove that a given activity "substantially
affects" interstate commerce, as the employment of such theories
would permit Congress to "regulate any activity that it found was
related to the economic productivity of individual citizens: family
law ... for example."
215
In essence, Judge Smith proffered the exact argument brought to the
forefront in the Morrison decision three years later: that all of the
congressional records and findings which the Bailey majority focused
upon in its opinion26 were irrelevant in that they were used simply to
provide an inferential, but-for connection to interstate commerce.217
Therefore, because the CSRA fails under each of these factors, and
"with the revival of federalism as a constitutional value in Lopez, [Judge
Smith] conclude[s] that the statute cannot survive constitutional
iterated in Morrison, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
209. Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1236 (Smith, J., dissenting). For this factor as iterated in
Morrison, see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
210. Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1236 (Smith, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 1237.
212. Id.
213. For these factors as iterated in Morrison, see supra notes 126-27 and accompanying
text.
214. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
215. Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1234 (Smith, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
216. See id. at 1225.




Another source of significant substantial-effects scrutiny comes from
a panel of the Sixth Circuit, and represents the closest the circuits have
yet come to a split over the CSRA. This particular panel, led by Circuit
Judge Batchelder, was the first appellate court in the nation to actually
hold the CSRA unconstitutional.219 Overruled by the 2001 Faasse II
case, discussed in some detail above,220 this case, Faasse I, nevertheless
represents an important, if only symbolic, step towards recognizing the
inherent constitutional complexities of the CSRA. In actuality, the
substantial-effects portion of this analysis echoed much of Judge Smith's
dissent in Bailey. However, by this time Morrison had been decided-
and the Faasse I decision made use of it by stating that a large dollar
amount does not, in itself, satisfy the requirement of a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. 1
What are most striking and convincing are not Judge Batchelder's
arguments addressing the Commerce Clause, but rather those
addressing basic principles of federalism. His central theme was that,
when states have chosen not to regulate something via a criminal
penalty, Congress does damage to the structure of federalism by
imposing a criminal sanction anyway.2  To illustrate this, the court
provided a description of Michigan's system of regulating child support
obligations, which relies on the sanctity of judicial discretion and creates
a steadily increasing civil penalty structure ranging from wage
garnishment to (when it appears to the judge that other measures
appear unlikely to correct the delinquency) civil incarceration.223 Thejudge then contended that the CSRA undermines the effectiveness of
this valued judicial discretion, and since Michigan trial court judges are
elected, it therefore "prevents Michigan officials from regulating in
accordance with the views of the local electorate. 24 Judge Batchelder
went on to state:
[T]he Act carves up Michigan law by predicating liability on
218. Bailey, 115 F.3d at 1240 (Smith, J., dissenting).
219. United States v. Faasse, 227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Faasse 1, reh'ggranted, vacated, 234 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 265 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2001).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73,184-85,192-93.
221. Faasse 1, 227 F.3d at 671.
222. Id. at 665.
223. Id. at 665-66.
224. Id. at 666.
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violations of Michigan Court orders, but putting deterrence and
penalty decisions into the hands of United States officials in that
minority of cases in which the state of residence of the payer is
different from that of the childm
This places Batchelder's analysis directly in the same line of cases as
New York v. United States;26 by arguing that the CSRA, in essence,
dictates the direction of state officials, he invoked the federalist
principles brought to bear in that case. Judge Batchelder affirmed this
reading: "By piggybacking a criminal sanction on Michigan child
support orders, the CSRA recognizes the primacy of the State's laws at
the same time that it expressly overrides portions of such laws."'
Hence, this judge, perhaps to the exclusion of all other circuit court
judges who have presided over a case reviewing the constitutionality of
the CSRA, has seen fit to point out the place that Lopez and Morrison
hold in the theoretical structure of the Rehnquist Court's recent
federalism cases. Though perhaps not an earth-shattering change in
today's state-federal balance of power, Lopez and Morrison, along with
New York and Printz, nevertheless represent a reminder to Congress
that it is not the case that "the Court lacks the authority and
responsibility to review congressional attempts to alter the federal
balance."'
However, some question remains as to whether the Court has done
what it seems to have set out to do in Lopez and Morrison. As
illustrated above,229 by articulating the analytical framework for the
Commerce Clause in a compartmentalized, three-pronged fashion, the
Court has seriously misstated its precedents. True, the three
justifications for commercial regulation by Congress do have precedents
in the case law, but those precedents also dictate that the only one that
can stand alone as a justification is the substantial-effects test. The
"channels" and "instrumentalities" rationales, as such, have since 1937
been subsumed under the overarching analytical framework that the
Court has built up around the substantial-effects doctrine. While this
may seem like splitting hairs and of no practical consequence, the very
fact that the circuit courts have utilized these rationales in construing
225. Id.
226. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). See also discussion of New York and Printz, supra note 17.
227. Faasse 1, 227 F.3d at 666.
228. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
229. See supra Part III. C.
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the CSRA so as to avoid having to do a substantial-effects analysis is
portentous. Indeed, though the Smith dissent and Batchelder opinion
outlined above may not be entirely convincing, they nevertheless raise
grave concerns as to whether the CSRA would actually pass a serious
application of the test, such as was applied to the GFSZA in Lopez.
Therefore, by misstating its precedents in such a way as to undermine
that which it apparently hoped to accomplish in Lopez, the Court has
created a way to circumvent the newfound rigors to be applied as a
result of that decision.
That the Supreme Court must at least address the issues presented
herein is therefore undeniable. A final example lends credence to this
assertion: one district court seems actually to have stumbled upon the
thrust of the argument presented herein. In United States v. King,20 the
Southern District of New York ruled that "the holding in Morrison
clarified that Congress may regulate conduct that obstructs interstate
commerce through the Commerce Clause only where that conduct has a
'substantial effect' on such commerce-i.e., under the third prong of
Lopez.""' In reversing that decision, the Second Circuit noted:
It would appear that, under the district court's reading of
Morrison, Congress cannot regulate activity that obstructs either
channels of interstate commerce, or instrumentalities of and
persons and things in interstate commerce-the first and second
categories of the Lopez framework-unless the regulated
commerce-obstructing activity independently satisfies Lopez's
third prong-substantially affecting commerce-as well.232
Though the Second Circuit may well have been correct in stating
that the Morrison decision likely did not intend that result,233 it is
important to note that the Southern District of New York was not
entirely misguided in saying so, in that its decision is justified at least in
part by the discussion of Supreme Court precedents conducted herein.
The fact that the Second Circuit dismisses the idea with little or no
discussion indicates a need for the Supreme Court to provide a cogent
discussion on the subject and institute guidelines for the lower judiciary
230. No. 51 00 Cr. 653 (RWS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1120 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2001),
rev'd, 276 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2002).
231. Id. at *13-14.
232. United States v. King, 276 F.3d 109,112 (2d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
233. Id. at 112-13.
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by decisively addressing the matter. The fiasco in the lower courts over
the CSRA has illustrated a need for the Supreme Court to reconsider its
conception of its own precedents, and consequently to advance an
unequivocal, unified test for regulations passed under the Commerce
Clause.
VI. CONCLUSION
Within the framework of modern-day Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, federal courts have little or no choice but to address the
Lopez decision before determining the constitutionality of a federal
statute. This is because Lopez, at least initially, purports to impose a
limit on the congressional commerce power, a condition unheard of for
well over a half-century. However, Lopez does more than that: through
the Court's use of a compartmentalized, three-prong test to determine
the constitutionality of a regulation promulgated under the Commerce
Clause, it has introduced a semantic "loophole," which allows federal
courts to circumvent the newly instituted rigors of the substantial-effects
test. More properly, this loophole comes to light via the explication of
the "channels" and "instrumentalities" justifications as separate and
distinct justifications for congressional commercial regulation, despite
the fact that Supreme Court case-law seems to indicate that these two
justifications have long since been subsumed by the overarching
substantial-effects analysis.
That this is a real, practical tension within the Lopez decision, and
not just a purely academic distinction, is quintessentially illustrated by
the wealth of federal circuit case-law surrounding the constitutionality
of the Child Support Recovery Act. In deciding these cases, the federal
circuit courts have consistently taken advantage of the loophole so as
not to have to subject the Act to the rigors of a revitalized substantial-
effects analysis. Instead, the courts have consistently upheld the Act
under either the first or second prong of the Lopez analysis, thereby
circumventing the heightened level of scrutiny required by the third
prong."' The circuits were not technically wrong in doing so, however,
234. Consequently, the circuit courts can avoid what may very well be the most difficult
standard that the CSRA would otherwise have to meet, i.e., the substantial-effects analysis.
From the discussion supra Part IV, the observation may easily be made that a Lopez-style
substantial-effects analysis would be the most arduous test for the CSRA to pass. It makes
sense, then, that the vast majority of the circuits did not even attempt an in depth substantial-
effects analysis. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text. Rather, as this Comment
has set out to illustrate, the circuits merely dismissed a serious application of the substantial-
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in that the Lopez Court misstated its precedents so as to allow such an
interpretation. Consequently, the Lopez decision, while purporting to
serve as a limitation of congressional regulation, undermines itself by
allowing a way to bypass such limitations. Hence, the Court would do
well to clarify exactly what it intended when it divided the Commerce
Clause analysis into three separate justifications for regulation,
apparently against the weight of over a half-century of precedents.
These precedents seem to indicate that, at least since 1937, the
substantial-effects analysis is the one, overarching test that a particular
statute must pass in order to be deemed constitutional under the
Commerce Clause.
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